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INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

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November 17, 1989

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: T - R. Bartholomew
FROM: ART - E. Rowny
SUBJECT: Malta Meeting

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- The Malta meeting presents an excellent opportunity to add momentum to the political changes sweeping Eastern Europe. However, to do this the meeting must not become an "arms control summit." Here are some suggestions on how to implement such a strategy.

-- In discussing what is happening in Eastern Europe and within the USSR, reinforce the idea that further reform and greater freedom serve both our interests.

-- We should also address other regional problems, i.e. tell Gorbachev that Soviet subsidies for destabilizing regimes in Central America, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Libya and North Korea undermine US/Soviet relations.

- If Gorbachev says that Malta should move arms control forward, we should focus the discussion on process and not engage on substance.

- The one area of arms control it will be profitable to discuss with Gorbachev is CFE, since it has few risks and large possible gains.

-- CFE can reinforce our broader political goals for Europe by reducing the Soviet military presence and increasing the freedom of action of the Eastern European states.

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- CFE is a litmus test of Soviet commitment to military stability in Europe. Gorbachev should be pressed into making good on Soviet statements that they are willing to reduce their large asymmetries in equipment, aircraft and troops by rapidly concluding a CFE treaty.
- -- In contrast, there are potential risks and few gains in discussing START. The remaining issues which divide us are fundamental; there is little room for compromise in our position. The fact that the Soviets have out-paced us in modernization only reinforces this point.
- We should expect Gorbachev to make some new offer on the ABM Treaty and START which jeopardizes SDI. He may also propose moratoria on fissionable materials and production of strategic weapons. These are all losers for us.
- Gorbachev will certainly attempt to involve us in naval arms control. The mounting campaign which began with Akhromeyev's visit and was continued by Shevardnadze in Wyoming will be advanced by the media who will exploit the symbolism of a meeting at sea to advance the "reasonableness" of naval arms control. We must be prepared to combat this no-win situation, to include a statement by the President upon his arrival on the cruiser that the US Navy is not on the bargaining table.
- On the political level, Gorbachev may try to persuade us to look the other way should he crack down on movements for self-determination, human rights or further democratization.
 - We should tell him that setbacks in reform will set back our relations.
- Gorbachev may again propose dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The bonds of NATO members are far stronger and more diverse than military security interests. Such a proposal should be dismissed out of hand.
- Gorbachev may also say that this is the time to work together toward a neutral and united Germany. It is entirely premature and improper to enter into any such discussions. Free democratic choices in both the GDR and the FRG, together with thorough consultations with our European allies, should guide the future shape of Germany.
- In sum, **Malta discussions should not focus on arms control.** CFE can be addressed in the context of supporting our political objectives in Europe. The best outcome would be one where we and the Soviets have a frank exchange of views on the fast-moving events of Eastern Europe and on our displeasure with Soviet actions in other regions.
- I have also sent these ideas to the President.

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